HIICAID v. HARDIN COUNTY.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
KINCAID v. HARDIN COUNTY.
In the absence of express statutory authority a county or other quasi municipal
corporation, is not liable to a private individual for damages sustained by him by
reason of the negligent construction of a court-house, or because of negligence in
not lighting an unguarded and dangerous stairway leading to a court-room.
The case of Wilson v. Jefferson County, 13 Iowa 181, which decides that a county
is liable for an injury caused by its negligence in the construction of a bridge, distinguished, and its principles adhered to but not extended.

APPEAL from Hardin District Court.
It was averred in the petition that the defendant was the owner of
a two-story building in Eldora, Hardin county, which is used as a
court house, and in the upper story of which the sessions of the
District and Circuit Courts were held; that on the 15th day of
October 1878, the plaintiff was in attendance as a witness upon a
night session of the District Court in said building; that the said
building was accessible only by a narrow and unguarded stairway,
which at night was extremely dangerous and unsafe to pass down
unless lighted by a lamp or other artificial light, as the defendant
well knew; that when said evening or night session of said court
adjourned, plaintiff started to go down said stairway, using all
possible care and diligence, but, owing to the unskilful and negligent manner in which said stairway was constructed, and owing to
the gross negligence of the defendant in not lighting or properly
guarding said stairway, the plaintiff, without fault or negligence on
his part, fell from the top of said stairway to the floor below, by
reason of which he was severely injured, and for which he asked
There was a
judgment against the defendant for $10,000.
demurrer to the petition, which was sustained. Plaintiff appealed.
William

.

Allen, for appellant.

Huff & Reed and Porter & Moir, for appellee.
ROTHROCK, J.-We are required to determine in this case
whether a county is liable in damages to a person injured by reason
of the negligent construction of a court-house, and because of
negligence in not lighting an unguarded and dangerous stairway
leading to a court room. If, in the discussion of the question,
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regard is to be had to adjudicated cases, it must be
held that no
such liability exists. See 2 Dillon Mun. Corp., §
762; Cooley's
Const. Lim. 246; 2 Addison on Torts 1298. A
large number
of authorities are cited by the learned authors; and
in Addison on
.
Torts it is said: " A
plainly marked distinction is made and should
be observed, between municipal corporations proper,
as incorporated
villages, towns and cities, and those other organizations,
such as
townships, counties, school districts and the like, which
are established without any express charter or act of incorporation,
and
clothed with but limited powers. These latter political
divisions
are called quasi corporations, and the general rule
of law is now
well settled, that no action can be maintained against
corporations
of this class by a private person for their neglect of
public duty,
unless such right of action is expressly given by statute."
That municipal corporations proper are liable to an
action for
damages in such cases is settled beyond all question.
The question
has generally arisen in actions for injuries caused
by unsafe and
defective streets, sidewalks and bridges upon public
thoroughfares;
and, as is said in ,oper v. Henry County, 26 Iowa
264, "there
may be found decisions in almost all, if not in every
state of the
Union to the effect that such actions may be maintained."
In the
same case, it is said, on the other hand, the decisions
are almost,
(though not wholly), uniform to the effect that counties
and other
qjuasi corporations are not liable to private actions for
the neglect
of their officers in respect to highways, unless the
statute has, in
so many words, created the liability, especially giving
the action to
the party injured."
The authorities cited in support of the proposition are,
in the main,
the same as those cited by the learned text writers
above quoted.
We need but refer to a few of them, which closely
resemble the
ase at bar. In Commissioners of Hamilton County
v. Afighels,
7' Ohio St. 109, it was held that a county was not
liable for an
njury suffered by plaintiff, who, when in attendance
upon court as
t witness, was precipitated into the cellar of the court-house,
in
,onsequence of tie negligent omission of the agents
or officers of
he county to guard or light a dangerous opening leading
into the
'ellar.
In Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray 541, it was held
that a town
.1Massachusetts, which had assumed the duties of a school
district,
vas not liable for an injury sustained by a scholar
attending the
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public school from a dangerous excavation in the school-house yard.
owing to the negligence of the town officers.
In Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, it was held that a town
was not liable for an injury to a person received by the giving
away of the floor of a town house at an annual town meeting, the
building having been negligently and defectively constructed by
those who built it for the town. The ground upon which it is held
that quasi corporations, such as counties, towns, school districts, and
the like, are not liable for damages in actions of this character, is
that they are involuntary territorial and political divisions of the
state, created for governmental purposes, and that they gave no
assent to their creation, whereas municipal corporations proper are
either specially chartered, or voluntarily organized under special
acts of the legislature.
This court, years ago, held that a county was liable for an injury
to a person caused by a defective county bridge: Wilson and Gustin
v. Jefferson county, 13 Iowa 181. That case has been followed
in a number of other cases down to the present time, although exhaustive arguments have been made insisting that it should be
overruled, s against not only the weight, but the whole current of
authority. As often as the question has been made the rule has
been adhered to without deviation. In Huston v. Iowa county, 43
Iowa 456, it is said: " We have no inclination now to review,
either for the purpose of fortifying or overturning a case (referring
to Wilson and Gustin v. Jefferson county) which has for so long
a time, in so many instances, and in so deliberate a manner been
sanctioned and followed."
It is insisted by counsel for appellant, that the defendant must
be held liable in the case at bar, because such liability rests upon
the same ground and is controlled by the same principles as the
cases involving liability for injuries caused by defective bridges. It
must be admitted that a distinction between one injury resulting
from a defective county bridge, and one caused by a defective and
improperly constructed court-house, is not very plain or easily demonstrated. But as the line of decisions in this state as to the
liability for defective bridges stands almost if not quite alone, as
we have seen, we have no disposition to carry the doctrine further
than is necessary to sustain the decisions of the court, which have
stood so long that it may truthfully be said they have the implied
sanction of the law-making power and the people of the state:
Krause v. -Daviscounty, 44 Iowa 141.
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There is a recognised distinction, however, which we will proceed briefly to examine. An examination of the cases where it is
neld that quasi corporations are not liable in actions of this character, will disclose that the reason of the rule is, as before observed,
that they are involuntary political divisions of the state, created for
governmental purposes; and in Bigelow v. Randolph, supra, it is
said that the rule holding these quasi corporations not liable, is of
limited application. "It is applied in the case of towns only, to
the neglect of or omission of a town to perform those duties which
are imposed upon all towns without their corporate consent, and
exclusively for public purposes, and not to the neglect of those obligations which a town incurs when a special duty imposed on it
with its consent, express or implied, or a special authority is conferred on it at its request."
The statutes of this state contemplate that every county shall be
provided with the necessary county buildings, and to that end, by
section 303 of the code "the board of supervisors are empowered
to build and keep in repair the necessary buildings for the use of
the county and the courts." Section 173 provides that "when a
county is not provided with a regular court-house at the place where
the courts are to be held, they shall be held at such place as the
board of supervisors provide."
It will be seen that all counties are required without their assent,
and exclusively for public purposes, to provide a room or place
for holding the courts. The counties have no option concerning
this duty. It is an involuntary duty imposed upon them by the
state, and imposed upon all alike. The obligation to build bridges
is different. The statute leaves it to the respective counties to determine what bridges shall be built. It is provided that the board
of supervisors shall have power "to provide for the erection of all
bridges which may be necessary and which the public convenience
may require within their respective counties, and keep the same in
repair:" Code, § 303, sub. 18.
The respective counties are not absolutely required, by this provision of the statute, to build any particular bridge, or to build any
1,ridge whatever. It is a question to be determined by the board of
supervisors, taking into account the wants and convenience of the
public. Now, when they elect to build a bridge, it may very probably be said that, under the rule last above referred to, the county
incurs a duty by its consent and should be liable for the negligence
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of it, or for negligently permitting the bridge built by its express
consent to become out of repair.
We are aware that this distinction has not been taken in any of
the cases determined by this court, but it seems to us to be sound,
and, unwilling as we are to extend the liability of these quasi corporations further than already obtains, which, if done, must inevitably lead to inextricable complications arising in actions for all
possible negligent acts, we conclude that the ruling of the District
Court should be affirmed.
The rule of law that a quasi corporation is not liable to a private action at
the suit of a party injured by the neglect
of its officers to perform a corporate duty,
unless such action is given by statute, is
well settled. Russel v. Men of Devon,
2 Term 667, is the leading case upon this
point, and has been followed in a large
number of subsequent cases which will
be found collected in Cooley's Const.
Lim. *247, note. The following cases
may be cited as illustrative of this principle :
Stickney v. Wzlem, 3 Allen 101, where
a town was held not liable to one who,
while stopping to converse in a public
highway, leaned against a defective railing, and was injured. See, also, Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475.
So, a county is not liable for the escape
of a debtor in consequence of the insufficiency of the jail: Haygood v. Justices,
20 Ga. 845.
So, in Wehn v. Gage County, 5 Neb.
494, it was held that a county was not
liable at the suit of a private person for
damages occasioned by reason of the
erection of a county jail in near proximity to his residence, even though the
jail was kept in so filthy a condition as
to become an actual nuisance to those
persons living near it.
So, it is well settled that quasi corporations are not at this common law liable
for injuries resulting from defects in
their roads, bridges or buildings. See
Symonds v. Clay County, 71 Ill. 355 ;
People v. Young, 72 Id. 411 ; Cooleyv.

Freeholders, 27 N. J. 415; Sutton v.
Board, 41 Miss. 236; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 ; Eastman v. Meredith,
36 N. H. 284; Reardon v. St. Louis, 36
Mo. 555 ; Galen v. Clyde, 27 Barb. 543.
So, a county is not liable to an inmate
of its hospital who sustains injuries from
unskilful treatment by the resident physician, or from the failure of the officers
of the hospital to supply sufficient and
wholesome food: Sherbourne v. Yuba,
21 Cal. 113.
So, a town is not liable fTr injuries
caused by the negligence of its health
officers while in possession of a vessel
appropriated by them with the owner's
consent for a hospital: Mitchell v. Rockland, 52 Me. 118.
So, where a county employed an agent
to clear off brush on its poor farm, and
the agent, in burning the brush, negligently permitted the fire to spread upon
an adjoining farm, it was held that the
county was not liable: Sysnonds v.
Board, 71 IIl. 355.
Nor is a county liable for injuries
caused by a road overseer placing the
abutment of a bridge in such a manner a.
to cause the waters of the stream to wash
away land or the improvements thereon :
Crowel v. Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 313.
The above cited cases will serve to
illustrate the rule, and illustrations might
easily be multiplied.
The rule, however, that counties being
political subdivisions of a state, are not
liable for the laches or misconduct of their
servants, is inapplicable where the per-
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formance of the work is voluntarily assumed in the first instance, or is a special
duty imposed Dy the legislature, and assented to by the county: Bannon v. St.
Lor&s County, 62 Mlo. 313 (following
Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247), where,
by the negligence of the contractor, a
workman, employed by him, was killed
by the caving in of a ditch dug on the
grounds of the county insane asylum,
under the supervision of the county engineer, and the county was held liable.
"A distinction is, also, made between
those corporations which are created as
exceptions and receive special grants of
power for the peculiar convenience and
benefit of the corporators, on the one
hand, and the incorporated inhabitants
of a district, who are by statute invested
with particular powers, without their
consent, on the other. * * * The reason

which exempts these public bodies from
liability to private actions, based upon
neglect to perform public obligations,
does not apply to villages, boroughs and
cities which accept special charters from
the state. The grant of the corporate
franchise, in these cases, is usually made
only at the request of the citizens to be
incorporated, and it is justly assumed
that it confers what to them is a valuable
privilege. This privilege is a consideration for the duties which the charter
imposes." See Cooley's Coust. Lim.
247-8, and the cases there cited.
Considered in the light of the authorities above cited, and which might easily
be multiplied, the decision in the principal case seems entirely correct.
Ct. 1. EW 1L.
Chicago, June 11, 1880.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
LUKE P. POLAND v. LAMOILLE VALLEY RAILROAD CO.

ET AL.

A railroad company issued in succession three series of bonds, secured respectively by first, second and third mortgages. Afterwards it being found necessary to
issue more bonds to complete the road, 18-23ds of the first mortgage bondholders
agreed that a preference mortgage, which should be a lien prior to the bonds held by
them, should le given to secure such additional bonds. Upon a bill filed to ascertain the priorities of the securities: Hdd, that the agreement of thr. 18-23ds of the
first mortgage bondholders did not work a forfeiture of their lien as against the
second and third mortgages, but that equity would treat their agreement as ar equitable mortgage of their lien to secure the preference mortgage bondholders.
A statute of Vermont authorized railroads to mortgage their rolling stock and
personal property without delivery of possession; but provided, that nothing in the
act should prevent such property from being attached for claims for services rendered
or materials furnished in running the road or keeping it in repair. The mortgagees
of an insolvent railroad which was indebted for such claims filed a bill against all
parties in interest, and obtained the appointment of a receiver to run the road until
final decree. Held, that the right given by the statute to the holders of these claims
to obtain a priority over the mortgagees, was not lost by the appointment of the
receiver.
Held further, that althouga such claimants could not proceed at law by attachment against the property in the hands of the receiver, yet the eourt would givs.
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effect to the right to such attachment by enforcing the priority of their claims in the
administration of the property.
leldfurther, that such claimants had not lost their priority by taking promissory
notes for the amounts of their debts.
Held further, that as the rolling stock had been diminished in value in its use by
the receiver, and as the mortgage of the road provided for the application of its income to its current expenses, these creditors were entitled, after the mortgagecs haa
been given a reasonable time to pay their claims, to have the rolling stock sold, and
iF tl-e proceeds proved insufficient, then to have the net earnings of the receivership
applied to the payment of their claims.
Held further, that the services for which the statute gave an attachment were services of employees who actually performed the manual labor, and not services
rendered in the official and executive management under which the work was done.
Held further, that the materials for which the statute gave an attachment, were
such only as were indispensable in making repairs, and were annexed to the property
and became part of it, or were consumed by it in the use, but did not include officerent, stationery, telegraphing, printing of bill-heads, tickets, time-tables, &c.

BILL in equity for an account and foreclosure, and the appointment of a receiver.
On the first day of May 1871, the Lamoille Valley Railroad
Company, the Montpelier and St. Johnsbury Railroad Company
and the Essex County Railroad Company, associated together for
the purpose of building a railroad from the Connecticut river to
Lake Champlain, known as the Vermont division of the Portland
and Ogdensburg Railroad Company; in order to raise money to
construct, complete and equip their railroad, they executed to Luke
P. Poland and Abraham T. Lowe, as trustees, a trust deed of their
railroad, including all its real and personal property, together with
the tolls and incomes and all their corporate rights and franchises
in trust to secure the payment of $2,300,000, in joint bonds issued
by said companies, with semi-annual interest coupons attached. In
the habendum it was stipulated that the conveyance vas made and
accepted upon the following trusts:
1st. To secure the payment of the principal and interest upon
tfae joint bonds ratably and without preference, &c.
3d. Until default in payment of the principal or interest, or in
performance of the covenants of the mortgage to permit the mortgagors to operate and repair the said railroad and take, receive and
use the tolls, rents, issues, incomes andprofits thereof, and apply the
same to the payment of the current expenses of the roads, and to
the purchase of necessary machinery and equipment, or dispose of
the same for the lawful uses of the mortgagors in any manner not
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inconsistent with the mortgage, with power to pay any net annual
income to stockholders after providing for the interest on bonds.
4th. In case of default in payment of the principal or interest
upon the said bonds, as the same should conic due, and of a continuance of such default for four months after written demand of
payment, then the trustees, upon the written request of the holders
of a majority in amount of such bonds in respect whereof the default
was made, should take possession of all, or, in their discretion, any
part of the mortgaged premises, and operate the said railroads and
receive the income, and out of the same pay: 1st. The expenses of
operating the same, including such reasonable compensations as
they might allow to the several persons employed or engaged in the
running and superintendence of the same, and all taxes, assessments,
eharges or liens having priority or preference to the lien of these
presents upon the said premises or any part thereof, and a reasonable compensation to the trustees, and also the expenses of keeping
the said roads and appurtenances, the locomotives and rolling stock
thereof in good and sufficient repair, &c.
6th. The trustees were empowered, after a default for six months
and on request of the holders of three-fourths in amount of outstanding bonds, to take possession and sell the mortgaged premises
at auction.
On the first day of April 1874, said companies executed a second
mortgage of the same property to the same trustees to secure the
payment of joint bonds to the amount of $1,770,000,'and u on the
same trusts as those expressed in said first mortgage. About
$125,000 only in bonds were issued under this mortgage.
On the first day of January 1875, said companies, jointly with
the Lamoille Valley Junction Railroad Company and the Maine
division of the Portland and Ogdensburg Railroad Company, executed a third, called a consolidated mortgage, of their several railroads, to said Poland and Israel Washburne, Jr., and P. H. Brown,
as trustees, to secure the joint bonds of all said companies, to the
amount of $9,500,000, and upon like trusts to those expressed in
said first mortgage. About $80,000 of this class of bonds were
issued.
The first named three companies, having expended the proceeds
of all said bonds and being insolvent, and said second, and said
consolidated bonds being unsaleable, and the sum of $500,000 in
money being necessary to complete their railroad, on the 18th day
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of July 1876, executed a fourth, called a preference mortgage, of
all the property, rights, tolls and income described in said firs&
mortgage, to said Poland, trustee in trust to secure the payment of
$500,000 in joint preference bonds issued by said companies and
upon the other trusts expressed in said first mortgage.
And it was provided in said last-named mortgage that no bonds
should be issued under it until the holders of the first mortgage
bonds, to the amount of $1,800,000. should have signed an agreement in writing in the following words, to wit: "We whose names
are hereto subscribed, holders of bonds of the numbers and amounts
set against our respective names, issued under, and secured by the
first mortgage of the Essex County Railroad Company, of the Montpelier and St. Johnsbury Railroad Company, and of the Lamoille
Valley Railroad Company, hereby severally agree that for the purpose of completing and equipping the line of the said several railroads to Lake Champlain, in Swanton, Vt., under existing contracts
or otherwise, and of paying the interest on the debts, for the payment
of which a portion of such bonds are pledged, the said several railroad companies may issue bonds, to be denominated preference bonds,
in character like the first mortgage bonds, to the amount of $500,000,
secured by a joint mortgage of the several railroads and their equipment, like unto the first mortgage thereof, which shall constitute and
be a lien on the same, prior to the bonds held by us severally; the
mortgage and bonds to be made to the Hon. Luke P. Poland as
trustee; said preference bonds to be payable, principal and interest,
in gold, in twenty years, and at the option of said companies after
five years from the first day of May A. D. 1876, and to bear
interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum semi-annually.
This agreement and consent is not to be binding until the holders
of the first mortgage bonds, to the amount of $1,800,000, shall
execute the same, nor until the trustee in the preference mortgage,
being one of the trustees of the first mortgage, shall consent hereto
in writing; said preference bonds are nit to be pledged or sold for
less than their par value without the consent of said trustee, and
none of said bonds are to be issued by said trustee until he is fully
satisfied that the said companies have made such arrangements and
contracts, that the issue of said bonds will accomplish the completion of the line to Lake Champlain, and that said companies will
pay the interest on the debts for the payment of which the first
mortgage bonds are pledged, for at least two years from the date
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of the preference bonds. Dated this seventh day of April A. D.
1876."
And the said paper was signed by holders of the first mortgage
bonds, stating the numbers and denomination of the bonds held by
each to about the amount of $1,870,000 dollars. And said Poland
gave his consent as trustee thereto in writing, as provided in said
agreement.
Default in the payment of interest upon the first mortgage bonds
was made in May 1876, and about that time upon all classes of said
bonds, and October 18th 1877, this bill was brought by the trustee
under said preference mortgage, asking to have the priorities of
said securities ascertained, an account of all said bonds taken and
for a proper decree of foreclosure. The bill also set forth that the
roads of said companies we're very incomplete and unfinished, and
must soon have a very considerable expenditure of money thereon;
that said companies were largely indebted to many persons who are
not secured upon the property at all; that if said roads remained
in the hands of said companies, all the earnings of the roads and
all the personal property would be taken for unsecured debts of
said companies, and wholly diverted from the payment of interest
due to mortgage bondholders; that complainant, as trustee under
said preference mortgage, had declined to take possession and run
said roads as trustee; that the trustees under the said first mortgage had also declined to take possession, and that they regarded
it as simply impossible for them so to do without the greatest peril
of pecuniary loss and ruin to themselves. Complainant therefore
prayed the court to appoint a receiver to take possession and operate
said road, under the order and protection of the court, until a final
decree should be made in the premises. A cross-bill was filed by
the trustees under the first mortgage with like prayer for relief.
The bill and cross-bill also set forth that complainants were
informed and believed that the said railroad companies, in the running and operating their said roads, jointly, as aforesaid, had become
indebted to various persons for services and supplies furnished for
that purpose, and that such creditors claimed to have some kind of
equitable lien either upon said roads or the personal property
thereon, or the earnings and income thereof; that complainants
had no knowledge as to the amounts so due, or to whom, except
that they were informed that George E. Howe, of St. Johnsbury,
and Capen, Sprague & Co., of Boston, Massachusetts, claimed to
VOL. XXVIII.-62
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be creditors of that character, and therefore complainants asked
that they might be made defendants to represent their own claims
and all others having like claims.
Receivers were appointed October 18th 1877, upon the filing of
the original bill, who immediately took possession of all said property and still hold it.
The original and cross-bills were answered by the trustees and
sundry bondholders under the consolidated mortgage, and by J. R.
Nichols, a first mortgage bondholder, who did not assent to the
preference mortgage, and by George E. Howe, Capen, Sprague &
Co., unsecured creditors named in said bills. These creditors also
filed a cross-bill, claiming a priority upon the personal property
described in said mortgages, and upon the earnings of said mortgaged property for the payment of their claims. This latter crossbill was answered by the orator in the original bill and by certain
holders of first mortgage bonds, denying all equity therein. It was
also demurred to by sundry other bondholders.
A master was appointed to take an account of the several classes
of bonds, and an account of the debts of George E. Howe, Capen,
Sprague & Co., and other creditors in said last mentioned cross-bill
named and claiming to be preferred creditors.
The cause was heard before a chancellor at the June term of the
Court of Chancery for Caledonia county, and a pro forma decree
entered upon said cross-bill of the trustees under the first mortgage
in favor of said trustees for a foreclosure against the trustees and
bondholders under said second and consolidated mortgages and said
companies, and in case such decree became absolute the decree further ordered a foreclosure in favor of said trustee under the preference mortgage against said companies and such holders of first
mortgage bonds as assented to the preference bonds, unless said
preference bonds be paid within a time therein limited, and further
ordered that said trustee be subrogated to and have all the right
and interest of said assenting bondholders in said first mortgage,
and further ordered that the cross-bill of the preferred creditors be
dismissed.
The trustees under the consolidated mortgage, J. R. Nichols, a
non-assenting first mortgage bondholder, and the preferred creditors
appealed.

L. P. Poland, for trustees under first mortgage.
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B. J. Phelps, B.
bondholders.
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. _ifield and Guy? C. Noble, for preference

Thomas H. Russell, for appellant, Nichols
D~avis & Stevens, for trustees under consolidated mortgage.
Belden. & Ide, for preferred creditors.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POWERS, J.-The first question presented upon the appeal is,
whether the preference bonds are entitled to the priority which the
parties concerned in their issue intended they should have. No
one of the first mortgage bondholders who assented to the issue of
the preference mortgage by the railroad company, and who signed
the agreement above recited dated April 7th 1876, is here objecting
to the priority now claimed for the preference bonds. But they
stand in court content to have the priority of the preference bonds
accorded to them as agreed, and the duty of redeeming their interest
in the first mortgage, enjoined upon them as ordered by the decree
below.
The appellant, Nichols, claims that by the transaction resulting
in the preference mortgage, the non-assenting first mortgage bondholders alone now have the security of the first mortgage. The
trustees under the consolidated mortgage claim substantially the
same thing.
The bonds issued under the first mortgage share ratably, and
without preference in the mortgage security. The whole amount
issued was $2,300,000. Those assenting to the preference mortgage in round numbers amount to $1,800,000, and the non-assenting to $500,000. The non-assenters therefore own 5-23ds of the
first mortgage.
Nothing can advance the fractional share of the non-assenters
except an extinguishment of the bonds of the assenters or a cancellation of the security pledged for their payment; neither event has
transpired. The bonds are as valid now as before the execution of
the agreement and the preference mortgage. The security of the
first mortgage is still pledged for their payment as before.
No attempt was made-none could successfully be made-to give
a priority to the preference bonds over those of the non-assenters,
or, by a kind of tacking, to postpone the consolidated bonds.
The assenters undertook to deal with their own bonds and
security in a way to improve their value. If the assenters had
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pledged their bonds to A. for collateral security, their ratable share
of the first mortgage would go to the assignee.
Leave the fact of the preference mortgage itself out of view, and
suppose that the assenting first mortgage bondholders, desiring to
raise money to complete the -road, and thus make their security
valuable, had loaned of A. 8500,000, and pledged their interest in
the first mortgage as security by an instrument as informal as the
agreement in question, would not a court of equity, as between
the parties, treat the agreement for security, as security? That is
precisely the effect of this agreement. The assenters said to the
preference bondholders, you lend your money to the companies to
enable them to complete their road, and take their mortgage, which
as a lien upon the property must be subject to all existing encumbrances, and we will give you as a further security our interest, or
18-23ds of the first mortgage, as collateral. We will encumber
that interest with the burden of your debt; we agree that your
bonds "shall be a prior lien upon the property." Is there anything
in this transaction prejudicial to the rights of other parties interested in the property or anything incapable of practical enforcement in a court of equity? The preference bondholders did not
lend their money upon the mortgage by the companies of a property
already hopelessly buried under the load of three existing mortgages, nor on the credit of the insolvent companies. They demanded security and the assenters undertook to give security.
There can be then no question as to the purpose of the agreement. The agreement is that the preference bonds shall be a lien
upon the property prior to the bonds held by the assenters, not
prior in time, but prior in order of payment. This agreement
was incorporated into the bonds themselves and thus made them an
equitable mortgage: Jones on Railroad Securities, sect. 75. A
lien upon the property prior to the bonds of the assenters could
only be created by subordinating their lien to the new lien, that
is by mortgaging the first as security for the second.
There is nothing in the estate of a mortgagee that makes such a
mortgage in equity invalid or impossible. Want of form is immaterial.
Equity looks only to the substance and so moulds that into form as
to work out the intent of the parties. A mere agreement to give a
mortgage is treated in equity as a mortgage: Jones on Mortgages,
sects. 163, 167 ; Jones on Railroad Securities, sect. 73, et seq. Even
if the agreement indertakes to mortgage a thing not in esse, equity
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will treat the contract as a mortgage when the thing comes into being,
and charge it with a lien in favor of the party intended: Jones on
Railroad Securities, sect. 122, and numerous cases there cited.
When. therefore, the decree in favor of the first mortgage bondholders becomes absolute, the assenters will hold their interest
charged with the lien agreed to be given to the preference bonds.
An equitable mortgage will not be upheld which works a wrong to
third parties, but where their interests are undisturbed, they are
enforced for the purpose of executing the intent of the parties:
Miller v. R. & W. Railroad Co., 36 Vt. 452 ; Jones on Railroad
Securities, pa8sim.
To carry out the intent of the parties in this case works no wrong
to the non-assenters, as they stand under the decree precisely as
they would if no preference mortgage had been made; nor to the
consolidated bondholders, as they must redeem only so much as
they voluntarily assumed when they took their mortgage. The invalidity of the agreement is not urged by the party bound by it,
and neither of the appellants ought to be heard to question it,
much less to profit by it.
By what system of logic is it established that this attempt to
give security is to be held inoperative to effectuate the purpose intended, but operative to work a forfeiture o" 18-23ds of the first
mortgage? What has occurred to advance the interest of the nonassenters from 5-23ds to 23-23ds of that mortgage?
The transaction amounts to a mortgage, or it is altogether inoperative. By it the interest of the assenters either passed in pledge,
or did not pass at all. If it did not pass. it remains where it was
lodged before, and the assenters still hold their fractional share in
the first mortgage.
To say that a court of equity shall defeat the purpose of this
scheme that was devised, and has been operative to make the first
mortgage more valuable, the share of the non-assenters equally
with the rest, and at the same time declare that by means of it,
the share of the non-assenters, who have paid nothing, has been
magnified five-fold, is a novel proposition to advance in a court of
.equity. All the advantage that the non-assenters can reap from the
t'ansaction is found in the increased value of their security.
The questions arising upon the cross-bill of George E. Howe
and others are new in this state, but are of easy solution.
These orators as a class are seeking to enforce a common right
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against a common fund which they claim is, in equity, chargeable
in their favor. The bill is not multifarious, and these orators have
a proper standing in court. They insist that the companies were
indebted to them at the time receivers were appointed for services
rendered and supplies furnished to the railroad, and that the seizure
of the property by receivers has not defeated their right to charge
the chattel property, and the net earnings of the receivership with
the payment of their claims.
They predicate their claims, first, upon sections 101 and 102 of
chap. 28, Gen. Stat., which reads, "Section 101. All mortgages of
railroad franchises, furniture, cars, engines and rolling stock of any
kind, when properly executed and recorded, shall be effectual to
vest in the mortgagee a valid mortgage interest in and lien upon
all such property without delivery or change of possession; and
for the purpose of mortgage, all such property shall be deemed
part of the realty.
"Section 102. Provided, nothing in the preceding section
shall prevent such furniture cars, engines and rolling stock, from
being attached by any person having a claim against the corporation
owning such property for an injury sustained on the road of such
corporation, by reason of any neglect of said corporation, or for
services rendered or materialsfurnishedfor the purpose of keeping
said road in repair, or in running the same, or for any liabilities
as common carriers, or for the loss of any property while in the possession of said corporation; and such property when so attached may
it could have
be taken, held and disposed of in the same manner as
been if that section of this chapter had not been passed."
At the time the several mortgages above described were executed,
chattel
we had no law in this state authorizing the execution of
of chattel
mortgages and but for this section, 101, such mortgages
creditors
property by railroad companies would be invalid as against
was
101
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embarrassment
this
obviate
To
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passed, such mortgage without change of possession would be void
as to creditors.
As against the preferred creditors, therefore, the property,
remains unencumbered by the mortgage.
This statute was in force long before the execution of the
mortgages, hereinbefore described. The bondholders, therefore,
took their security with notice of its subordination to the righti of
such claimants.
In view of the necessity of a change of possession to make such
a mortgage effectual, it is clear that no court of equity would
undertake by means of a receivership to seize the property, and
give to the mortgagee a possession that would, or could, operate as
a substitute for the possession required by the statute, especially
upon the ground avowed in this bill, that the trustee cannot afford
to take possession and asks the court to do so to prevent the exercise
of this very right of attachment which is accorded to these creditors.
Such a proceeding would work a nullification of the statute-it
would be an attempted overthrow of a legal right and priority
which no court has the power to accomplish. The doctrine is
elementary that the appointment of a receiver alters no existing
rights in respect to the property seized. It merely stays the
enforcement of rights by the parties in interest for the time being.
It operates like an injunction pendente lite.
By the terms of the deed of trust, the trustee, upon default in
the payment of interest on the bonds for four months after demand
and on request of a majority of the bondholders, was empowered to
take possession of the property-run and operate the road and
take the income.
Counsel argue that this entry into possession was accomplished
bv the creation of the receivership; that the receivers are holding
for the mortgagees; that the receivership was the result of a "race
of diligence" between the bondholders and these creditors, and
that the only right accorded the creditors by the statute was the
right to attach the property, if by diligence they could reach it
before the bondholders seized it.
Whatever might be claimed for a possession by receivers established upon other grounds, it is obvious that in this case they do
not hold solely for the mortgagee. The authorized representative
Of the bondholders declined to take possession under his mortgage
right. He implored the court to take possession not for him nor
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those he represented, but to prevent these creditors getting in, and
asked the court to hold the possession and operate the road by
receivers "until a final decree be made in the premises."
The receivers hold for whom it may concern.' The creditors are
made parties defendant to the bill and cross-bill; they are asked to
set forth and litigate their rights; they have done so upon proper
averments and proofs and upon answer made to their claim. The
final decree therefore, "which shall be made in the premises," will
determine the priority to this chattel property, which among other
things the court is asked to seize. The receivers hold for the
contending parties ; for the creditors as well as all others interested.
Although the statute accords the right of attachment, a right
merely to proceed at law, still this right is to have effect in equity
if the creditors standing upon it are summoned to that forum to
establish it. It verges upon serious trifling to say to these creditors,
you ought to have attached this property and not slept upon your"
rights a year or more until the court seized it. It is subjecting
the valuable substance to technical mode and form, and enabling
crafty -vigilance by the aid of the official signature of a chancellor,
obtained ex-parte without notice, to place that valuable substance
beyond the reach of those entitled to it, not by any adjudication
that changes- the character of the right itRey, but a change of
venue that renders the statutory remedy technically improper in
the new pasture given to the property.
Section 102 makes the chattel property attachable on a claim for
a personal injury on the road. If A. received a severe injury by
the gross negligence of the company, could the company screen the
property from liability by a "change of ministry?" Could the
bondholders wrest the property from liability by securingreceivers
upon an ex parte application and hearing before A. had even had
time to take out process? Is this new way of .paying old debts
to receive the sanction of a court of equity ?
The right to attach the chattel property, exists now as perfectly
as before the appointment of receivers, but the court adjudged that
the-best interests of all concerned would be subserved by enjoining
the exercise of the right, and having so determined, it is not supposable that the court would surrender the property to an attaching officer now, thus ending all occasions for a receivership. The
litigation of this question having begun in equity and the court
having assumed the handling and custody of the property, the case
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will be retained in that court for the final determination of all
questions arising under the claim of any party interested.
These creditors having a priority of legal right and the receivership conferring no new rights upon the mortgagees, it is for the
court to give effect to this priority in the administration of the property. The receivership is to be made chargeable as holding the
chattel property, subject to the prior right of these creditors to have
it made answerable to their claims.
The master's report shows that the chattel property when taken
by the ieceivers was worth dnough to satisfy these preferred claims.
It has been used in the operation of the road, and, consequently,
some of it has been consumed and destroyed, and all of it much
worn and depreciated in value. Other property of like kind has
to some extent been supplied in its place, but this is not all available to these creditors.
The receivership must be made a debtor and held to respond
from such resources as it has, properly applicable for that purpose.
The ground of the application for the receivership was the danger that these creditors would attach the chattel property and that
all its earnings, and the earnings of the road would be taken to
pay the unsecured creditors. This application could have been fully
answered by an injunction. In that case security for consequential
damages would be furnished by bond, and the property would have
remained in the custody of the mortgagor pending the proceedings
to foreclose. The receivership without bond of indemnity cannot
be permitted to operate differently upon the claims, rights and
interests of the unsecured creditors, from an injunction, nor work
a greater embarrassment upon the assertion and realization of such
claims, rights and interests.
We have thus far considered the equity of these creditors to have
this chattel property made available to them as flowing from the
priority given them by the statute in question.
But there is another ground equally tenable upon which the
receivership is equitably bound to respond, by applying the net
income of the railroad property in payment of these debts.
As we have seen, this mortgage is made upon the trust that until
default made in the payment of interest, the mortgagor shall remain
in possession, operate the road, take the tolls, rents and incomes,
and apply the same to the payment of the current expenses of the
road or dispose of the samefor the lawful uses of the mortgagor.j
VOL. XXVIII.-63
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The mortgagees took their security burdened with this trust.
The claims of these creditors are "current expenses of the road."
They should have been paid by the mortgagor out of earnings. If
.the earnings had been kept intact and, on the appointment of
receivers, had been delivered to them in cash, would not a court of
equity order that they be first applied in satisfaction of all back
arrearages of expense incurred by the mortgagor in the operation
of the road. The mortgagees could not object because they agreed
that these earnings should be so applied. The receivership altered
no rights in this respect, unless the doctrine that the "race of diligence" gives to the mortgagee earnings that they have agreed
belong to other parties, can be upheld. The mortgage of the tolls
and incomes does not give these earnings to the mortgagee. All
that passes under such a mortgage is net income. Income means
what is left after paying the expenses of earning income.
The trustee declines to take possession, and asks the court to
exercise an unusual and extraordinary jurisdiction in appointing
receivers. Seeking equity he must do equity. The court might
at the outset make it a condition in the appointment of receivers
that these debts should be paid or require security for them to
be furnished, or the order can be made at any later stage of the
.E.
proceeding: Fosdick v. Schall, 9 Otto 225; Ellis v. B. H.
608;
Bush.
12
Cline,
v.
Douglass
1;
Railroad Co., 107 Mass.
Duncan v. Ches. & Ohio Railroad Co., U. S. C. C., Virginia
District, 15 Am. Law Reg. 428, July 1876, and many other cases.
No case has been cited to the contrary and probably none can be
found. By the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagor was bound to
pay these debts from current earnings. The mortgaged estate is
now equitably indebted for the same. It would be highly inequitable for the receivers to take the estate relieved of this equitable
burden. Until the mortgagee takes possession of the road, he has
no right to its earnings superior to the mortgagor. The earnings
follow the possession. Whoever holds possession of the thing that
makes earnings, takes the earnings made.
Here the receivers hold possession for all parties in interest. The
parties in interest are the mortgagees, the mortgagors and these
preferred creditors, and the receivers must distribute net earnings
among these parties as their respective equities may appear. A
large amount of net earnings has already been expended in making
a new road, thus enhancing the value of the property as a security
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for the bonded debt; this chattel property upon which these creditors have a claim paramount to the mortgages has been used and
much of it worn out in making this net income so expended. After
default in payment of interest, the mortgagor was suffered to remain
in possession and incur the debts of these creditors in repairing the
road, and running it in the fulfilment of its duties to the public.
Can it be said that the mortgagees shall now be permitted to claim
that they have a superior equity to take the benefit of these services,
take the use of this chattel property and take the increased value
of their security without obligation to do equity ? Can they return
the chattel property in its depreciated condition in full satisfaction
of the claims of these creditors upon it? The mortgagor has no
equity to the net earnings. The question then is limited to the
relative rights of the mortgagees and these creditors. As between
these parties, under the circumstances of the case, it is beyond
question that the receivership is bound to apply its net income first
to the discharge of their claim. It is to be noted that this application of net income is merely paying an obligation that equitably
rested upon a portion of the property seized by the receivers and
which has been largely consumed to the advantage of the mortgagee
and thus consumed upon the mortgagee's express request, and that
net income is the only resource in the first instance that is properly
applicable to the discharge of any debt of the receivership, except
expenses of operation.
The Supreme and Circuit Courts of the United States have
repeatedly promulgated this doctrine, and the highest courts of
many of the states have concurred in it. (See cases, supra.) If
any case denies the doctrine, it has not been shown to us.
What creditors under the statute have this preferred right to
attach this chattel property ?
It is clear that construction expenses are excluded in section 102.
It is clear that general creditors are excluded. The statute
(section 101), makes the mortgage valid against all creditors
except those specially enumerated in section 102. Every liability
specified in section 102, grows out of the actual operation of the
road. It is a matter of general notoriety that the construction
and operation of railroads give rise to great conflicts of interests
between security holders, which portend imminent peril to the
wages of employees. This statute was intended as a protection to
them. It was the purpose of the legislature to protect a class of
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The protectioL
employees who could not protect themselves.
afforded, however, is in derogation of the rights of other creditors,
and therefore cannot be extended by construction beyond the clasa
of creditors specified: Coal Co. v. CentralRailroad Co., 29 N. J.
Eq. 252; Pennsylvania and Delaware Railroad Co. v. Leuffer,
84 Penn. St. 168.
In nearly all the states, statutes of similar import exist, all
having the same object of giving protection to a class of operatives,
who, scattered along the line of a railway, are engaged in a service
that precludes sharp watchfulness over the solvency and honesty
of their employers, and lack the means and opportunity of guarding
their own interests.
,The master has tabulated a list of claims (pp. 43-49, printed
case) for services rendered, and materials furnished in repairing
and operating the road. Some of the claimants named in this list,
might, from the duties they are generally understood to perform,
be properly excluded from the preference accorded by the statute,
such as the cashier and paymaster, and perhaps some others, but
the difficulty is that although the mortgagees, interested to defeat
the allowance of these claims appeared before the master by
counsel, and made specific objections to many claims, yet so far as
appears they made no objection to any claim enumerated in this
list. No exception to the report raising any question upon this
list of claims has been filed. No suggestion is made in brief or
argument by any of the numerous counsel who have been heard
that this list of claims included any claimants not entitled to share
in the privilege given by the statute. It is not the business of the
court to purge a list of claims that the parties do not question, but
-we are to treat it as the parties treat it, namely, as conceded to be
correct.
Some of the claimants have taken promissory notes for the
amount of their debts. Taking a note for an antecedent debt, is fi
this state presumably a payment of the debt, but the question is one
of intent. If the debt is one that carries a security of priority, it is
not to be presumed that a mere change in the form of the indebtedness was intended to defeat its priority, when the debtor is confessedly insolvent.
The statute must be construed in a way to carry out the
intent of the legislature. When, therefore, it accords a priority
zo claims for "services rendered" or "materials furnished" for the
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purpose of keeping said road in repair, or in running the same,
it is not to be extended beyond the obvious import of the language
used. Services rendered in keeping the road in repair might be
construed so as to include the officers of the road, but it was the
intent of the legislature to include only such persons as were
engaged in manual labor in making the repairs.
Services rendered in running the road includes the same class of
operatives and employees. The dividing line is between services
rendered in the official and executive management and authority
over the work of making repairs and running the road, and such
laborers and employees as do this work. The employers are
excluded, the employees included. Such is the rule adopted in
other states having similar statutes. Thus directors are exciaded.
The superintendent, who is an employee in his relation to the corporation, is an employer in his relation to the work of repairing and
running the road. He is the alter ego of the corporation itself. He
is not within the privilege of the statute: Jones on Railroad Securities, sect. 580. Nor is the civil engineer: Pennsylvania &- Dela.
ware Railroad Co. v. Leziffer, 84 Penn. St. 168; Broekway v.
Tnnes, 39 Mich. 47; JQnes on Railroad Securities, sect. 580. Nor
heads of departments, general agents and attorneys: Jones, supra.
And as the latter claimants cannot gain a priority over general
creditors for their services, they cannot gain it for rent of offices
and stationery used, or telegraphing ordered by them. Such
expenses are usual and proper in the operation of a railroad; so are
the services of directors and attorneys, but they are general debts
of the corporation.
It is said that the charges for printing tickets. bill-heads, posters,
time-tables, &c., ought to be treated as materialsfurnished in running the road. It would be ratlir difficult to classify such supplies
as materials furnished for keeping the road in repair. The word
materials has substantially the same meaning when used in connection with the work of repairing that it has in the work of running
the road, and means such supplies as are indispensablein making
repairs upon the road or its equipments, and are annexed to the property and become part of it, or are consumed by it in its use, such as
iron, ties, lumber, wood, coal, oil. &c. The same word is used in
the statute, giving a lien upon buildings. steamboats, mills, factories,
machinery, &c., to mechanics and material-men. The statute
creating mechanics' liens belongs to the same class of legislation as
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the statute in question. It has the same general object, applies to
the same class of persons and works out, substantially, the same
relief. The mechanic has a lien by law, provided he follows it by
his attachment of the property. The railroad employee has a lien
by law if he first makes attachment and thereby creates it. In the
latter case, a lien upon the road-bed and superstructure would be
of little value to the creditor, and hence the right to acquire it by
attachment is limited to such property as can be made practically
available.
The ground and reason of giving to a creditor who has furnished
materials for repairing, erecting or operating a factory, a lien upon
it or its machinery, is, that such supplies have been incorporated
into the building, and thus not only lost their identity as chattels,
but have increased the value of the principal thing to which they
are annexed: Stout v. Sawyer, 37 Mich. 313; Grosz v. Jackson,
6 Daly (N. Y.) 463; Phillips on Liens, 2assim.
If a printer who supplied posters and tickets to officials running
a steamboat or a theatre could fasten a mechanics' lien upon the
boat or building, upon the theory that he had furnished materialsfor
such structures he could gain'i like priority in this case. Such,
however, is not the construction given to this word as used in the
statute relating to mechanics' liens. The word made use of (materials), looked at in connection with the general purpose of the statute,
clearly refers to supplies of a different nature from printers' bills or
printed matter.
The decree below dismissing the cross-bill of the preferred creditors must be reversed, and such of them as have brought themselves
within this statute are entitled to relief.
In view of the condition of the road and its duties to the public
and its security holders, a reasonable time should be allowed to the
parties in interest to provide for the payment of these claims without serious embarrassment to the operation of the road, and failing
to make such provision, the chattel property named in the statute
should be sold under the order of the court and the proceeds ratably
applied in payment of these claims, and if any part thereof then
remains unsatisfied, the net earnings of the receivership must be
applied to extinguish the same.
The cause is remanded with mandate embodying the views herein
expressed.

FIRST NAT. IAI-K OF LOUISVILLE v. BRYCE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOUISVILLE v. JAMES BRYCE, &c.
Although a factor has no right to pledge the goods of his principal, yet if he does
so pledge to an innocent pledgee, the latter may in an action of trover brought by
the principal, claim a reduction of damages to the extent of the advances made by
the factor to the principal and for which the factor had a lien.
In this respect there is no substantial difference between the effect of a pledge
made by a factor and a pledge made by a pledgee.
Although, by the laws of Kentucky, warchouse receipts are made negotiable, the
holder of such a receipt takes no better title than if the goods themselves had been
delivered to him.
In trover against the holder of a warehouse receipt, for the goods, the date of conversion is the date of his acceptance of the receipt, and the value of the property at
that time is the measure of damages.
B. shipped goods to his factor for sale, and received advances from the factor
thereon. The factor stored the goods, pledged the warehouse receipts for his own
debt to C., and afterwards became insolvent. In trover by B. against C. Hdd,
that B. was entitled to recover the value of the goods, at the time of the transfer of
the receipt to C., less the amount of the advances made by the factor.

THIS was an action brought by the owner of goods to recover
damages for their conversion, against one to whom they had been
pledged by a factor. The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
L. N. Dembitz and Barr, Goodloe & Humphrey, for appellant.
Barrett & Brown, for appellee
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HINES, J.-Appellee, a manufacturer of flax bagging in Munice,
Indiana, shipped bagging at various times to Smyser, Milton &
Co., commission merchants in the city of Louisville, to be sold on
his account and proceeds remitted as required. Smyser, Milton &
Co. having advanced to appellee on current account $2994, and
having 840 rolls of the bagging unsold, placed it in the warehouse
of J. W. Stine & Co., and took receipts therefor in their own name.
These receipts they endorsed to appellant to secure a present loan
of $3360. Subsequent to the negotiation of this loan, Smyser,
Milton & Co. became insolvent, and executed a deed of assignment
for the benefit of all their creditors to Jacob L. Smyser, to whom
appellee tendered the amount of $2994, due from him to Smyser,
Milton & Co., and demanded his bagging. The assignee failing to
deliver the bagging, appellee made demand of appellant, accompanied by a notification that the assignee acknowledged the cor-
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rectness of the amount tendered to him, and requested appellant to
deliver the bagging to appellee. Appellee made no tender to appellant of the amount due Smyser, Milton & Co., nor of the amount
advanced by appellant to Smyser, Milton & Co., on the warehouse
receipts, and on the reffisal of appellant to deliver the bagging,
this action was instituted by appellee against appellant for the full
value of the bagging.
The answer claims, first, that appellant received the warehouse
receipts in good faith, and without knowledge that any other than
Smyser, Milton & Co. had any interest in the bagging, and was,
therefore, entitled to hold the property for the loan ; and second,
that appellee is a non-resident of Kentucky, having no property in
this state except the interest in the bagging, and asking to have the
$2994, due by appellee to Smyser, Milton & Co., set off against
any recovery that appellee might have in the action. A demurrer
was sustained to this answer, a judgment rendered against appellant for the full value of the bagging, that was fixed by the court

at $4200.
Two questions will be considered. 1st. whether a factor, independent of the Warehouse Act of this state, has power to make
valid pledges; 2d. whether that act enlarges the power of the
factor under such circumstances as here shown.
It may be conceded that in England, prior to the passage of the
Factors' Act in 1825, it was generally held that a factor could not
pledge, for his own debt, goods consigned to him for sale. This
rule in America has not, in its fullest sense, been followed, nor has
it been uniformly adhered to in England.
The case of Quieroz v. Trueman (1824), 8 B. & C. 842, appears
to confine the consignor's right of recovery, against the pledgee of the
factor, to the value of the goods, less the amount paid by the factor
to the consignor. In that case plaintiffs shipped to Caumont, a
commission merchant, certain cottons to be sold on their account.
Caumont delivered the cotton for sale to the defendants, who made
large advances on the cotton to Caumont, and defendants having
sold it, settled with Caumont's assignee in bankruptcy, deducting
the amount of advances. Plaintiffs brought an action in assumpsit
to recover the value of the cotton.
ABBOTT, 0. J., in delivering his judgment, says:
"The money advanced in this case was for Caumont's use, and
not for the plaintiffs; the defendants then have received the pro-
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ceeds of the goods, and have not paid them over to the principals.
Caumont in the first instance had no authority to pledge, nor did he
derive any from the correspondence. The plaintiffs are, therefore,
entitled to a verdict for the net proceeds of the goods, deducting
such charges as Caumont was entitled to make; also the sum which
he remitted on account of these goods; that leaves a balance of
26111. 158. 5d. due the plaintiffs."
It will be observed that, although it is said that Caumont had no
authority to pledge for the advance made by defendants, they were
permitted to reduce plaintiff's recovery by the amount paid to them
by Caumont on account of these shipments.
In the application of the principle established in that case it can
make no difference that the action was in assumpsit. All forms of
action have been assimilated by the code. It is only required that
the petition state facts, sufficient to constitute a cause of action
under any form of proceeding at common law, and, whether it be in
assumpsit or in trover, any defence whether at law or in equity,
may be pleaded and relied upon.
It does not appear that the pledge of a factor is tortious to such
an extent as to render it void ab initio,at least to the extent of his
lien.
In Story on Agency, sect. 113, it is said: "Factors have no
incidental authority to barter the goods of their principal, or fo
pledge such goods for advances made to them on their own account,
or for debts due by themselves; although they may certainly pledge
them for advances lawfully made on account of their principal, or
for advances made to themselves, to the extent of their own lien on
the goods."
Sect. 326, Story on Bailments, reads: "In America the general
doctrine, that a factor cannot pledge the goods of his principal,
has been frequently recognised. But it does not appear as yet to
have been carried to the extent of deeming the pledge altogether a
tortious proceeding, so that the title is not good in the pledgee even
to the extent of the lien of the factor; or, so that the principal may
maintain an action against the pledgee without discharging the lien,
or at least without giving the pledgee a right to recoup the
amount of the lien in the damages."
At the close of that section, in brackets (eighth edition), is the
following: " Later decisions have, however, fully settled the law
that a pledge by a factor of his principal's goods is wholly tortious,
VOL. XXVIII.-64
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and tne owner may recover their whole value of the pledgee without
any reduction or recoupment for his claim against the factor."
In support of this statement, the editor cites four cases, three of
which we think have no bearing on the question. The first is that
.of Hoffman v. Noble, 6 Mete. 74. That was not the case of a factor.
There a purchaser of certain wines, at auction, obtained possession of
them by fraudulent representations, and transferred them to an innocent purchaser for value, and it was held that the purchaser took
a title that was not defeasible. The second (Warner v. Martin, 11
Howard (U. S.) 209), is where the clerk of the factor delivered to the
defendant the goods of the plaintiff in satisfaction of a debt owing
by the factor to the defendant, he, at the time, knowing that the
factor was insolvent. Stress is placed by the court upon the proposition that the factor cannot delegate to his clerk authority to sell,
and upon the fact that the defendant knew of the factor's insolvency;
that no money passed; that the purchase was not made in the due
course of business, and that the recovery by plaintiff would leave
the defendant in as good an attitude as he was prior to the transfer
of the property to him. The third case cited (Hfolton v. Smith, 7
N. H. 446), is not in point. There the factor sold the goods in payment of his own debt, the purchaser knowing that the factor held
the goods for the consignor; and, besides, there was nothing due
from the principal to the factor. The fourth case cited (Newbold v.
Wight, 4 Rawle 195), (1833), is the only one that tends to sustain
the position stated in the note of the editor. In that case we are of
the*opinion that the question of the right of recoupment did not
necessarily arise, because it did not appear that there was any debt
due by the consignor to the factor. The conclusion of the court
upon this point was merely incidental to the discussion of the
principal questions in the case.
As said by Judge STORY, it is difficult to point out any substantial difference between the case of the pledgee and the case of a
factor. The factor holds the goods of his principal as a security
and pledge for his advances and other dues, with the right to sell.,
as the pledgee has the right on the pledgor making default. In
either case it is much more than a mere lien. There is a right of
dominion over the property to the extent of divestiture of title by
sale; there is a right in the thing, a special property, that makes
the rights of the pledgee and of the factor analogous. In -Donaldv
Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 597 (1866), SEE, J.,,says: "In all the deci-
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sions on pledges by factors, the relation between a factor, who has
made advances on the goods intrusted to him, and his principal has
been held not distinguishable, or barely distinguishable in its legal
incidents from the relation between pawnee and pawnor." If, then,
the pledgee may transfer the pledge, so as to give the transferee the
same right as against the pledgor that the pledgee had, why may
not the factor do likewise?
Generally, where the English authorities undertake to distinguish between the rights of a pledgee and of a mere lien-holder,
reference is had to a naked lien where there is only the right of
possession, unaccompanied by the right to exercise acts of ownership in the disposition of the property. Such a one, for instance,
as requires the intervention of a court of equity to divest the title
in satisfaction of the lien. We are not to be understood as saying
that the transfer of the pledge, or of the goods, by the factor, leaves
the contract between the pledgor and pledgee, and between the
principal and factor intact; it is to be considered to subsist for the
purpose of being referred to for the measure of damages sustained
by the pawnor or principal, and to determine the damages to be
recovered by them. (SnEE, J., in Donald v. Suckling, Law Rep.
1 Q. B. 597.)
Strictly speaking, it is not a right in the bailee to pledge or dis
pose of the property, for, ordinarily, the bailor may consider me
contract of bailment at an end, and may have an action against the
transferee for damages; the measure of which may be determined by
the original contract between the bailor and bailee. It is said by
MIELLOR, J., in Donald v. Suckling: "I think that when the true
distinction between the case of a deposit, by way of pledge, of
goods, for securing the payment of money, and all cases of lien,
correctly so described, is considered, it will be seen that in the
former there is no implication in general of a contract by the
pledgee to retain the personal possession of the goods deposited;
and I think that although he cannot confer upon any third person
a better title, or a greater interest than he possesses, yet, if nevertheless he does pledge the goods to a third person for a greater
interest than he possesses, such an act does not annihilate the contract of pledge between himself and the pawner; but that the
transaction is simply inoperative as against the original pawner,
who, upon tender of the sum secured, immediately becomes entitled
to the possession of the goods, and can recover in an action for any
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special damages which he may have sustained by reason of the act
of the pawnee in repledging the goods."
The facts in that case were, that the plaintiff had pledged certain
debentures with one Simpson, as security for the payment of a bill
of exchange drawn by plaintiff, under an agreement that Simpson
might sell or otherwise dispose of the debentures in case the bill
was not paid by the plaintiff. Simpson pledged the debentures
with the defendafit for the loan of money, which, remaining unpaid,
and the bill not having been met, plaintiff instituted a suit to
recover the debentures, without tendering the amount of the bill
which they had deposited as security. The judgment on demurrer
to the plea setting up these facts was for the defendant, COCKBURN,
C. J., says:
"The question here is, whether the transfer of the pledge is not
only E breach of the contract on the part of the pawnee, but
operates to put an end to the contract altogether, so as to entitle
the pawner to have back the thing pledged without payment of the
debt. I am of the opinion that the transfer of the pledge does not
put an end to the contract, upon which the owner may bring an
action; for nominal damages if he has sustained no substantial damage; for substantial damages, if the thing pledged is damaged in
the hands of the third party, or the owner is prejudiced by delay
in not having the thing delivered to him on tendering the amount for
which it was pledged." In support of the conclusion reached, the
case of Johnson v. &ear, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 330, is cited. The case
of Halliday v. Halgate, L. R. 3 Ex. 299 (1868), is decided on the
authority of Donald v. Suckling and of Johnson v. &ear; -Evans
v. Porter, 2 Gall. 13; opinion by Judge STORY.
In the case of Lewis v. Mott, 36 N. Y. 400 (1867), it was held that
the pawner could not recover of the transferee of the pledgee without discharging the obligation of the pawner to the pledgee. Talty
v. Freedmans' Savings and Trust Co., 3 Otto (U. S.) 321, cites and
approves the above-mentioned cases.
In Beldenv. Perkins. 78 111. 449 (1875), in assumpsit, it was
neld that the pawner could only recover of the vendee of the pledgee
the value of the property, less the amount due from the pawner to
tht pledgee.
DresserManufacturing Company v. Waterston, 3 Mete. (Mass.)
9 (1841), was trover for unbleached cotton cloths, which plaintiff
bad sold to A. upon agreement to print amid ship to B., and on
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receiving his acceptanee, turn them over to plaintiff, when title
would pass. A. procured the cloths to be printed, and shipped
them to defendant, who advanced on them. Held, plaintiff could
recover, but measure of damages must be value of cloths as unbleached.
In Clark v. Dearborn, 103 Mass. 335 (1869), lumber was shipped
by F. to A., who had advanced on it. He shipped to plaintiffs for
sale, who demanded it of the master of the vessel in which it had
been shipped, and tendered freight. The defendant, who had
attached it as sheriff on debt of F., paid the freight and took it
away from the vessel. In trover by the plaintiffs it was held that
they could recover, but damages must be reduced by freight.
In Whitney v. Beckford, 105 Mass. 267 (1870), a factor who had
bought goods for his principal, residing at W., sent them by mistake
to a person residing at S., who received them in good faith and paid
freight. Held, that in estimating damages in an action by the
principal against this person for the conversion of the goods, the
defendant was entitled to a deduction of the amount paid by him for
freight.
This equitable doctrine in an action of trover was recognised in
this state as early as 1837, in the case of Linville v. Black, 5 Dana
177; opinion by Chief Justice ROBERTSON. It is then said:
"Black having as constable several executions of fieri facias
against one Rudd, levied them on a slave (Joe) in his possession,
mortgaged by him, more than two months before, to Haley & Linville, by a deed which had not been recorded, and the mortgagees
having on the next day taken the slave from the possession of Black
without his consent, and sold or otherwise converted him to their
own use, he sued them in an action of trover and conversion, and
recovered a judgment for damages equal to his estimated value.
Against that judgment they now urge * * * that the assessment
of damages was exorbitant.
"The mortgage, for want of registration within the time prescribed by law, being void, so far as the execution-creditors were
concerned, the constable had a right to levy those executions on
Joe, and to sell him for the purpose of making the amount of
them; and so far he could maintain this suit even against the mortgagees. * * * So far as this suit is concerned, the mortgagees
occupy the place of the mortgagor, and the jilgment should be
just what it should have been had there been no mortgagee, and had
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Rudd himself, as owner of the slave, done what the plaintiff in error
did with him; and if the owner of a slave levied on by an officer
tortiously convert him to his own use, the officer thus wronged could
surely not justly claim, in an action of trover, more than the amount
which he had a right to make by a sale of the slave under execution.
If this judgment stand, there must be restitution of a part of it,
either to mortgagor or mortgagees. If it should be made to the
former the rights of the latter might be frustrated."
In ,Swigert v. Thomas, 7 Dana 223 (1838), the mortgagees of a
slave forcibly took it from a purchaser of the equity of redemption,
and the slave was afterwards sold, and the proceeds applied to the
mortgage debt. It was held that the damages that the first purchaser could recover could not exceed the value of the equity of
redemption, which was all that he acquired by his purchase. See
also Geohegan v. Ditto, 2 Mete. 483.
In the cases of Neiler v. .Kelley, 69 Penn. St. 403, Work v. Bennett, 70 Id. 484, and Baltimore Marine Insurance Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269, which were actions of trover by pledgers against
pledgees, for illegal sale of pledges, it was held that the amount of
the pledger's debt should be deducted from the damages.
The case of Pool v. Adkison, 1 Dana 110, has no application.
That was the case of the wrongful sale of property by an agent who
had received and not paid over the proceeds of the sale to his
principal, and the court say that trespass, trover, or detinue will lie.
Citing this case, counsel for appellee insist that the illustrations given
in the opinion and the authorities there cited sustain the view taken
by him. It will be observed that a majority of the court in that
case attempted to restrict these illustrations and citations to the
question under consideration. On page 118, Chief Justice ROBERTSON, delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, says: "In
deciding the question of liability in this case, we have referred to
other cases and authorities for the purpose of establishing the legal
doctrines which apply to the facts as stated in the instruction, and
should determine their legal effect. * * * Nor shall we feel
responsible for any misconstruction, or misapplication, of any
authority or dictum which we have quoted or cited." The questions
arising in Linville v. Black, 5 Dana 176, and in Swigert v. Thomas,
7 Id. 220, which are pertinent to the discussion here, did not arise
in the case of Pool v. Adkinson.
The case of Ne wcomb-Buchanan Company v. Baskett, 14 Bush
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658, does not authorize the deduction drawn from it by counsel for
appellee. In that case Taylor had no right to sell or in any way
encumber the title to the whiskey which was in Baskett, and, therefore, an unauthorized payment to Taylor by the Newcomb-Buchanan
Co. was not payment to Baskett, nor was it for his benefit, nor
did he derive either directly or indirectly any benefit from the transactions between Taylor and the Newcomb-Buchanan Co.; nor was
Baskett indebted to Taylor. Under such a state of fact the question
of recoupment or equitable set-off could not arise.
We think it clear upon principle and authority that ordinarily
there is no substantial difference between the effect of a pledge
made by a factor and a pledge made by a pledgee. The confusion
that appears to have arisen in the application of the law to particular cases, as they arise, seems to have resulted from a conflict
between the technical forms of action and the rules of procedure at
common law, and the manifest justice and equity of the cases. So
far has this gone that equitable defence, by way of recoupment or
equitable set-off, has been entertained and made effectual in actions
of trover. While saying that the factor had no right to pledge the
goods of his principal, the courts have, with great unanimity, allowed
the amount sought to be recovered of the innocent pledgee of the
factors to be reduced by the sums justly due from the principal to
his factor. Wherever the action sounds in damages, the plaintiff has
been restricted in his recovery to the damages actually sustained;
that is, in all cases when the factor or pledgee had all the indcicia of
the rights of property in the thing pledged, and the defendant was
without knowledge to the contrary, and gave for the property or on
the faith of it a valuable and present consideration. It seems,
therefore, needless to inquire whether, strictly speaking, the factor
or pledgee has "a right to pledge" the property intrusted to him,
as the measure of damages, if the defendant be innocent, is always
the actual loss sustained by the plaintiff. With this qualification as
to the plaintiff's right of recovery, it may be conceded that the factor
or pledgee has no right to repledge the thing intrusted to him fo,
advances made to himself; and even that such a pledge is wholly
tortious, giving the holder no property in or to the thing and that
the contract between the principal and his agent, who thus acts
without authority, is annulled.
From this stand-point, what is the situation of the parties, and
what are their rights ? Appellee is a non-resident, and without
property in this state. Smyser, Milton & Co.. who are insolvent
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and before the court by their assignee, are creditors of appellee iL
the sum of 82994, for which they held a lien on the bagging
intrusted to them by appellee. While that lien was in force, and
while they had all the indiciaofproperty in the goods, they pledged
them to appellant, without notification of their relation to the property, for the sum of $3360, advanced on the faith of their ownership. If appellee is permitted to recover of appellant the full value
of the goods, he will have received $2994 in excess of the damage
he has actually sustained; while appellant, an innocent purchaser,
for value, will be loser to the extent of 83360. It is true appellant
may have its judgment against Smyser, Milton & Co., but their
insolvency renders it of no avail. There is no question as to the
amount due by appellee, which he must pay to Smyser, Milton &
Co., or to appellant. He can have no ground for complaint if he
pays it, under the direction of the court, to appellant, for he will be
discharged from liability to Smyser, Milton & Co. by paying this
debt to that extent to appellant. This is manifestly equitable and
just to all parties and will fully protect the rights of all.
Although warehouse receipts are made negotiable by the law of
this state, the holder of a receipt takes no better title and stands in
no better attitude than if the goods themselves were held by him.
Such receipts, no matter under what section of the Act of 1869
they are issued, are in lieu of and represent the property to which
they refer, and their negotiability serves only to cut off any defence the
warehouse-keeper may have: Greenbaum Bro8. & Co. v. Me.qibben,
10 Bush 419. Any other construction would enable any one,
fraudulently depositing the goods of another, to pass title, as against
the true owner, by obtaining a warehouse receipt in his own name.
As is said in .Newcomb-Buchanan Co. v. Baskett, 14 Bush
667, the value of the property at the date of the conversion is the
true criterion of damages. This has long been the settled doctrine
in this state.
In this case the conversion occurred at the date of the transfer of
the warehouse receipts to appellant, and not at the date of demand
by plaintiff of defendant, appellant here. The acceptance of the
warehouse receipts as collateral for the advances made to Smyser,
Milton & Co., was an unauthorized exercise of dominion over the
property that amounted to a conversion, although it was done without knowledge of appellee's claim to the property.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directins for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

TOLEDO, WABASH, &c., RAILROAD v. WRIGHT.1

Supreme Court of Indiana.
TOLEDO, WABASH & WESTERN RAILROAD v. JAMES WRIGIlT.
A statute providing that for non-payment of fare, a railroad company may put a
passenger off the train at any usual stopping place, does not prohibit the company
from putting the passenger off, for this reason, at any other place.
Where a passenger, having ample time and opportunity to ascertain by proper
inquiry the regulations of the railroad company with regard to the purchase of tickets
and the payment of fare on the train, fails to make such inquiry, enters a train without a ticket and then refuses to pay the increased rate charged under the company's
rules to passengers not having a ticket, the conductor is justified in putting him off
the train at any place not dangerous to his life or limbs.

ERROR to Huntington Circuit Court.

This was an action against a railroad for an alleged breach of its
duty as a common carrier.
The complaint contained three paragraphs. In the first two,
plaintiff alleged that at different times, while travelling on defendant's road, the defendant had extorted from him a greater amount
than the usual rate of fare. In the third, he alleged that upon
another occasion, while travelling on defendant's road, defendant
forcibly, without lawful cause, and at a point other than a usual
stopping place, ejected him from the car and refused to carry him
further.
Defendant answered that it had established a passenger tariffrate between its stations, and that, as an inducement to pay at the
station, it discounted ten cents on every ticket purchased thereat;
that it did this in order to put a check on those who handled fares
on the train; that the plaintiff had tendered on the train ten cents
less than the regular fare, and upon his refusing in a boisterous
manner and to the disturbance of the other passengers, to pay the
regular fare, the conductor stopped the train and put him out.
On the trial, the facts relied on by the plaintiff, as set forth in
his own testimony, were substantially as follows: On the two occasions, mentioned in the first two paragraphs of his complaint, he
paid his fare on the train and was charged ten cents more than he
had ever paid before between the same stations, although he had
frequently travelled by defendant's road, sometimes with and sometimes without a ticket; that on the occasion mentioned in the third
paragraph of his complaint, he tendered thirty cents to the conductor, who refused it, saying that the fare was forty cents; that he
reminded the conductor that he had been carried between the same
VOL. )UXVIII.-65
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stations twice before for thirty cents; that he refused to pay forty
cents, whereupon the conductor stopped the train and put him our
at a place where there was no station, and which was about three
and a half miles from his destination.
'The court charged the jury that under sect. 28, Ind. Rev. Stat.
(which provided that a conductor might, for non-payment of fare,
eject a passenger "at any usual stopping place"), defendant had no
right to eject plaintiff from the train for a refusal to pay his fare,
except at a usual stopping place, and that if plaintiff was put off
for no other reason than the non-payment of fare, he was entitled
to recover.
The verdict was for plaintiff in the sum of $500. Judgment,
was entered thereon, and defendant appealed.
0. B. Stuart and T. A. Stuart, for appellant.
W. Hf. Trammell, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOWK, C. J., (after stating the facts).-Upon the case stated in
the third paragraph of the complaint, and the evidence given on the
trial, the court, of its own motion, gave the jury trying the cause
the following instruction, to wit: "In this state the law prohibits a
railroad company from ejecting a passenger from the cars, for a
refusal to pay his fare, except at a usual stopping place; and if
you find from the evidence that the defendant (plaintiff) was put off
the train at a place remote from an usual place, for no other reason
than that he refused to pay his fare, then the plaintiff is entitled to
recover."
It is evident, we think, that this instruction was founded upon
the court's construction of section 28 of the general law of this
state, providing for the incorporation of railroad companies, approved May 11th 1852. This section reads as follows: "Sect. 28.
If any passenger shall refuse to pay his fare or toll, the conductor
of the train and the servants of the corporation may put him out of
the cars at any usual stopping place :" 1 R. S.1876, p. 709.
It would seem from the language used in the instruction above
quoted, that the court must have construed the provisions of this
section 28 of the statute, as amounting to a positive prohibition
against any railroad company's right to put any passenger out of
its cars, for his refusal to pay his fare, at any other place than a
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usual stopping place for its cars, on the line of its road. Such a
construction of the section quoted is not required by the language
used therein, and is not in harmony with the general law of this
state on the subject of the section; and, therefore, we are not
inclined to adopt it. The section is permissive and not prohibitory
in its terms. It allows a railroad company to do a given thing for
a specified reason, at a certain place, but the law does not prohibit
the railroad company, either in that section or elsewhere, from doing
the same thing, for the same or any other valid reason, or at any
other place. In the case of The Jeffersonville Railroad Co. v.
Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, it was well said by FRAZIER, J. : "The passenger who refuses to pay fare is from that moment an intruder, and
wrongfully on the train. He has no lawful right to be carrid gratis
to the next station. This is too plain to admit of debate. It follows, that he may be expelled at once."
The case cited was again before this court, on a subsequent appeal,
when the following language waa used, in the opinion of the court
by WORDEN, 0. J. (38 Ind. 1): "If the expulsion had been
rightful in itself, it might, perhaps, have been legally effected at
any time of day or night, and at any place, without reference to
stations, or the convenience and comfort of the party expelled."
The right of the railroad company to expel a passenger from its
cars, for his refusal to pay fare, as a rule, at any time "and at any
place without reference to stations," was not doubted or questioned
by the learned judge who wrote the opinion last referred to, but in
that case, it was shown that the passenger, Rogers, before entering
the appellant's car, had properly applied at the ticket office for a
ticket, and without fault on his part, but through the wilfulness,
mistake or inadvertence of its agent, had been unable to secure
such ticket, and it was very properly held, we think, on those facts,
that Rogers was entitled to be carried, by his payment to the conductor of the price of the ticket, and could not be required to pay
in addition to such price, the excess, which, by the rules of the
company, was charged the passengers who, without an effort to purchase a ticket, paid his fare on the cars to the conductor of the
train.
In the case last cited, and in the case of The Indianapolis,&5c.,
Railway Co. v. Iinard,46 Ind. 293, the legal right of a railroad
company to discriminate between the amounts of fare, where a
ticket is purchased, and where the fare is paid upon the train, and
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to demand, exact and receive a larger fare, in the latter case,
than the price charged for a ticket, is fully recognised by this court.
In the case at bar, therefore, the appellant had the legal right to
exact from the appellee for his fare between Antioch and LaGro,
a larger sum of money when paid to the conductor on the train,
than it would have charged him for a ticket between the same places;
and when the appellee refused, as he did, to pay the fare demanded,
the conductor of the train had the right, and it was his duty as a
faithful servant, to put the appellee out of the cars, and off his
train, at any time and at any place, on the line of the road, without
reference to stations, and without actual danger to his life or person., When he refused to pay his fare, he became an intruder, a
mere trespasser in the appellant's cars; and he had the rights of a
trespasser and no other rights. Certainly he had no right to be
carried by the appellant, without charge, to the next station..
It would seem from the record before us, that there were no intermediate stations on the appellant's road between Antioch and
LaGro, only a distance of six miles intervening between said places.
The appellee entered the appellant's cars at Antioch to go to LaGro,
and when the conductor demanded his fare, the train was very
nearly equidistant between the two places. When he refused to
pay his fare, it surely was not the appellant's duty to carry him
to LaGro, the place of his destination, before putting him off
the train. Yet if the court's construction of said section 28 of
the statute, as contained in the instruction above quoted, were
the correct one, the necessary consequence would be that all railroad 'companies in this state could be compelled to carry all their
passengers gratis to the next "usual stopping place."
It is claimed by the appellee in this case, and it was so testified
by himas a witness on the trial, that he had never heard before
that an extra charge was made for fare when paid on the train. It
is difficult to reconcile and harmonize the appellee's evidence in
this regard, with the first two paragraphs of his complaint and his
evidence in support of said paragraphs. For, in those paragraphs
he claimed, and his evidence tended to sustain such claim, that,
within one week prior to this attempted trip from Antioch to LaGro,
the appellant's conductor, on two different occasions or trips,
extorted from him on the train ten cents on each trip more than
the usual or customary fare. It is difficult to believe that he had
so recently suffered the loss of these two sums of ten cents each by
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extortion, as he claimed, without having inquired into and ascertained, as he might easily have done, the probable cause or pretext
for such alleged extortion. But, however, this may have been, it
is not claimed or pretended, that he could not have readily ascertained, by proper inquiry, the rules and regulations of the appellant
in regard to the purchase and price of tickets, and the payment o.
passenger fare on the train. If he did not know the appellant's
rules on these subjects, he ought to have inquired of its agents,
before he became a passenger on its cars. It is not claimed that he
did not have an abundance of time and ample opportunities to make
all proper inquiries and purchase a ticket of the appellant's agent
at Antioch before he entered the cars. Having failed to purchase
a ticket, or to ascertain the rules of the appellant in regard to the
payment of passenger fare on the train, he was in fault; and when
the conductor demanded of him ten cents more than what he supposed was the regular fare, he should have paid the money and
investigated the matter afterwards. Upon his refusal to pay his
fare, the conductor was fully authorized and justified, as we have
already said, in putting him out of the cars and off the train, at
any place not dangerous to his life or limbs.
For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the court's instruction, above set out, to the jury trying the cause, was erroneous and
ought not to have been given; and on this ground, a new trial
ought to have been granted.
Another cause for a new trial, assigned by the appellant, was
that the damages were excessive. We have already said, that on
the appellee's evidence, and under the instructions of the court, the
jury could not have assessed the appellee's damages, on the first
two paragraphs of his complaint, at a sum in excess of twenty
cents. We are bound to conclude, therefore, that the residue of
the damages, to wit, the sum of $499.80 was assessed by the jury,
in appellee's favor, for and on account of the matters stated in the
third paragraph of his complaint. In his evidence, the appellee
gave in substance thc following account of the matters, for which
the jury assessed his damages in the sum last named: On a summer
evening in the month of August 1873, at a point on the appellant's
road between Antioch and LaGro, at the request of the conductor
of a passenger train on said road, he, the appellee. having refused
to pay his fare, stepped out of and off the appellant's cars. From
that point he walked on the tow-path to the town of LaGro, a dis-

